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THE BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE IN 
DISPARATE IMPACT DISCRIMINATION 
CASES 
Susan S. Grover* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When an employer's facially neutral practice disproportionately 
harms minority or women workers, the workers may sue for 
disparate impact discrimination under Title VII.1 An employer 
whose practice is found to have such an impact may avoid liability 
by proving that the challenged discriminatory practice is required 
by "business necessity. "2 Long the subject of case-law colloquy, the 
business necessity defense secured a statutory foundation in the 
1991 Civil Rights Act. 3 Although the new provision aspired to 
provide statutory guidelines for the business necessity defense, 4 it 
ultimately left open precisely the questions that antecedent case 
law had failed to resolve. The overarching issue continues to be 
whether the term "necessity" in the business necessity defense 
literally requires that the discriminatory practice be essential to 
the continued viability of the business, or whether it requires 
something less. 5 This Article argues for the former interpretation. 
Those who argue that the defense requires a demonstration of 
something less than true necessity generally rely on one of two 
rationales. One rationale compares disparate impact analysis with 
*Associate Professor of Law, College of William and 1\fury. Thanks to Robert Belton, 
Martha Chamallas, Marty Malen, and Michael Zimmer for their comments on earlier drafts 
of this Article. 
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A}{B) (Supp. V 1993); see 
also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding facially neutral practices 
having discriminatory effect violate Title VII). 
2 42 U.S. C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1XA}{B); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. "Business necessity"' is here 
used as an umbrella term for an affirmative defense encompassing the concepts of both 
business necessity and job relatedness. See infra notes 3&-39 and accompanying text 
(discussing relationship between business necessity and job relatedness concepts). 
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)-(B). 
4 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3{2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991). 
5 I use "continued viability" to mean that relinquishing the discriminatory practice will 
compel the employer to cut back its business, resulting in employee layoffs. 
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the disparate treatment analysis applicable to cases of intentional 
discrimination. 6 This argument focuses generally on perceived 
distinctions between the levels of culpability involved in the two 
types of cases and calls for a lighter defense burden in impact cases 
(where there is said to be less culpability) than the strict necessity 
usually required by the bona fide occupational qualification defense 
(BFOQ) available in treatment cases (where there is said to be 
greater culpability). 
The other rationale relied on by those advocating a diminished 
showing of business necessity in impact cases focuses on the 
deliberative process. This argument contends that factfinders in 
impact cases should apply a balancing test in lieu of a strict 
necessity approach. Advocates of this methodology assert that 
balancing is the most effective way to safeguard the business-
autonomy interests Congress recognized as important when it 
enacted Title VII. 7 
This Article explores the foundations of these two rationales. It 
challenges the distinctions that are assumed to exist between the 
level of culpability involved in impact cases and the level of 
culpability involved in treatment cases. It also questions the 
fairness of a balancing approach in lieu of a strict necessity 
requirement. The Article concludes that both rationales actually 
point more readily toward an absolute necessity requirement than 
toward a lighter defense burden. 
6 Title VII has yielded two m~or theoretical frameworks for employment discrimination 
cases: disparate impact and disparate treatment. The Supreme Court has stated that these 
Title VII schemes, in addition to allocating burdens, "establish . . • an order for tho 
presentation of proof" at trial. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742,2746 (1993). 
With respect to relative strengths of the BFOQ and business necessity defenses, tho 
Supreme Court's pre-1991 Act decision in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls 
actually included dictum which expressly stated that business necessity is more lenient than 
the BFOQ defense. 115 S. Ct. 1196, 1203 (1993). Johnson Controls reflected the same 
Supreme Court view of business necessity that was advanced in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and which was expressly legislatively overruled in the 1991 
Civil Rights Act. See infra text accompanying note 22. 
7 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 7246-47 (1964) (stressing important business-autonomy 
interests that Title VII should not infringe upon). 
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II. THE BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE 
A. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT OF DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court first recognized the disparate impact theory 
and its business necessity defense in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 8 
Prior to passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Duke Power Co. 
hired black workers in only one of its five departments-the "labor 
department."9 After the 1964 Act forbade segregation in hiring, 
Duke Power adopted a facially neutral policy requiring applicants 
for work in the four "white" departments to have a high school 
diploma and satisfactory scores on both a standardized general 
intelligence test and an aptitude test. 10 These requirements 
excluded black workers from the four departments at a far greater 
rate than they excluded whites. 11 A unanimous Supreme Court 
held that facially neutral practices with such disproportionate 
impacts on blacks violated Title VII unless justified. 12 To justify 
the practices, the Court required Duke Power to show both 
business necessity and job relatedness, apparently equating the two 
concepts: "The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be 
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. "13 
Many of the lower court cases following Griggs required that the 
challenged practice be essential, not just efficacious, to the defen-
8 401 u.s. 424 (1971). 
9 ld. at 427. 
10 Id. at 427-28. 
11 Id. at 430. The high school diploma requirement, for example, would hnvc excluded 
88% of the state's black residents and only 66% of its white residents. The tests util.iz.cd by 
Duke Power had in another case been found to exclude blacks at a rote of94% while whites 
were excluded at a rate of 42%. Id. at 430 n.6. 
12 I d. at 430. The Court found the practices "{froze] the status quo of prior discriminatory 
practices." Id. Because the Griggs Court was looking at a perpetuation of pre-Act 
intentional discrimination, its language could be taken as indicative that impact annlysis is 
appropriate only in cases involving otherwise unchallengeable intentional discrimination. 
In fact, Griggs has been taken more broadly to permit impact chnllenges where there is no 
hint of discriminatory motive. E.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); New York 
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Dothard v. Rnwlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
13 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. In Griggs, the Court found no business necessity at Duke 
Power with regard to an acceptable purpose (such as predicting successful performance in 
the jobs to be filled) because no proof existed that the chnllengcd educationnl criteria were 
effective predictors. Id. at 431, 432 n.7, 436. 
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dant's business. "[The] doctrine of business necessity 'connotes an 
irresistible demand.' The system in question must not only foster 
safety and efficiency, but must be essential to that goal."14 
Moreover, the Supreme Court's own decisions in Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody15 and Dothard v. Rawlinson16 characterized the 
business necessity defense as a narrow one, requiring that the 
discriminatory practice be "necessary to safe and efficient job 
performance."17 "[T]he [concurrences and dissents in the] Albema-
rle and Dothard decisions[, however,] showed the beginnings of a 
breakdown of the consensus regarding ... [the business necessity 
standard]. "18 
The Court's full retreat from Griggs's strict business necessity 
14 MarkS. Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 318, 343 (1987) (quoting United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 
308 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973)); see also Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 
523 F.2d 1290, 1295-98 (8th Cir. 1975) (supporting narrowly construed business necessity 
defense); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (same); 
Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. 
L. REV. 376, 387 n.47 (1981) [hereinafter Business Necessity] (citing cases construing business 
necessity narrowly). But cf. Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination Under the 
1991 Civil Rights Act, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1031 (1993) (arguing Court's post·Griggs 
decision in Dothard, 433 U.S. at 321, "did not require that the criterion be necessary for tho 
business to survive or for the job to be done at all but rather that it be 'necessary' for tho job 
to be done well"). 
15 422 u.s. 405 (1975). 
16 433 u.s. 321 (1977). 
17 Id. at 331 n.14; see also Pamela L. Perry, Balancing Equal Employment Opportunities 
with Employers' Legitimate Discretion: The Business Necessity Response to Disparate Impact 
Discrimination Under Title VII, 12 INDus. REL. L.J. 1, 11·17 (1990) (discussing Supremo 
Court development of business necessity doctrine). 
18 Perry, supra note 17, at 15. This breakdown developed further in New York Transit 
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). In Beazer, the Court found the plaintiff had failed to 
demonstrate a sufficient disparate impact in the employer's practice, but noted it would have 
allowed the business necessity defense if the employer showed merely that its "[legitimato] 
goals [would be] significantly served by[,] even if they do not require[,]" the practice. Id. at 
587 n.31. Arguably, the lighter burden proposed by the Court was a function of tho safety 
purpose underlying the drug abuse-related practice challenged in Beazer. 
Ironically, while the Griggs Court stated of the defense that "the touchstone is business 
necessity," in a subsequent decision, the Court repeated the "touchstone" language but 
altered the standard to lessen the burden on defendants. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), the Court stated that "the touchstone of this inquiry is a 
reasoned review of the employer's justification for his use of the challenged practice." Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). 
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standard finally materialized in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio.19 In Wards Cove, the Court espoused in dictum a far 
lighter burden on the employer than it had applied in earlier 
impact cases.20 Under Wards Cove, the challenged practice need 
not be " 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business for 
it to pass muster."21 This aspect of Wards Cove met with congres-
sional disapproval. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress 
reinstated the stricter standard. 22 
B. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS: THE 
1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided the first express legislative 
authority for disparate impact analysis and its business necessity 
defense. The 1991 Act imposes on defendants the burden of 
proving "that the challenged practice is job related for the position 
in question and consistent with business necessity. "23 Even if the 
19 490 U.S. 662 (1989). The previous year, a plurality of the Court asserted the same 
position in Watson. 
20 In the pre-Act case of International Union, U.A. W. u. Johnson Controls, this lighter 
standard was expressly described as "more lenient for the employer than the statutory BFOQ 
defense." 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1203 (1991). On remand from the Supreme Court's Wards Cove 
decision, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the pre- and post-Words Cove standnrds as follows: 
The district court on remand found again that the employer's interest in 
saving money justified its failure to winterize all of the bunkhouses. 
Although economizing in this way may have been unnecessary to the 
canneries' success or survival, we cannot say that it fails to serve the 
legitimate goal of reducing operating costs. 
Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 10 F.3d 1485, 1503 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 57 (1994). 
21 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. The Court stated that "this degree of scrutiny would be 
almost impossible for most employers to meet, and would result in a host of evils. • I d. 
22 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (Supp. V 1993). 
23 Id. § 2000e-2(k}(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). The pertinent provisions of the 1991 Act 
provide: 
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is e.stnb-
lished under this title only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impnct 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or nationnl origin and 
the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged 
practice is job related for the position in question and consis-
tent with business necessity; or 
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described 
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defendant succeeds in making this showing, the Act still imposes 
liability if the plaintiff demonstrates the availability of a less 
discriminatory alternative business practice which the defendant 
refuses to adopt. 24 
Although the 1991 Act purports not to alter the business 
necessity doctrine that pre-existed Wards Cove, the Act's language 
facially suggests three changes from earlier case law. First, 
Congress's conjoining of job relatedness and business necessity in 
the Act represents a departure from some earlier case law that 
allowed a defendant to prevail by showing either job relatedness or 
business necessity.25 The language "consistent with business 
necessity," on the other hand, could be interpreted as weaker than 
its precursors, requiring something less than absolute "necessity." 
Finally, codification of the less-discriminatory alternative doctrine 
clarifies the allocation of proof burdens and suggests that necessary 
does indeed mean essential. 
The only legislative history available to explain the meaning of 
the statutory terms is contained in an interpretive memoran-
dum. 26 That memorandum provides that "the terms 'business 
in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment 
practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative 
employment practice. 
Id. § 2000e-2(k}(1)(A). 
24 !d. § 2000e-2(k)(l}(A)(ii). "The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall 
be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of 
'alternative employment practice.' " Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C). 
One commentator has observed that the Act's language providing for establishment of a 
less-discriminatory alternative may be read as a potential substitute for the plaintiff's initial 
establishment of a practice's disparate impact. Alito, supra note 14, at 1016. While tho 
language of the provision may be ambiguous, such a reading is illogical. It would not make 
sense for Congress to impose on courts the obligation of considering every less-discriminatory 
alternative without requiring the plaintiff to make some showing that the current practice 
has a discriminatory impact. But see id. at 1038 (stating such interpretation is consistent 
with logic and policy). 
25 See Business Necessity, supra note 14, at 387 n.47 (providing relevant case law). 
26 Section 105(b) of the 1991 Act instructs courts to ignore any legislative history that 
purports to elucidate the business necessity defense, but permits reference to an accompany· 
ing "interpretive memorandum." Section 105 provides that 
[n]o statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at 
Vol. 137 Congressional Record Sl5276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be 
considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative 
history in construing or applying, any provision of the Act that relates to 
Wards Cove Business necessity/culmulation/alternative business practice. 
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necessity' and ~ob relatedness' are intended to reflect the concepts 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and 
in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing 
Co. v. Atonio. "27 Because the Court's decisions preceding Wards 
Cove were not consistent among themselves,28 however, definitions 
for these seemingly straightforward statutory terms must be 
derived from the theoretical and policy underpinnings of the 
business necessity defense. 29 The memorandum does nothing to 
explain how "necessary" the practice must be or how the less-
discriminatory-alternative concept interplays with other compo-
nents of the defense. This Article examines the business necessity 
defense in order to aid the task of deriving such doctrine. 
C. THE ELEMENTS OF DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS 
A disparate impact case begins with the plaintifl's establishment 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1075 (1991). Whnt. exactly, the Act intended to 
codify is especially unclear in light of the Court's plurality decision in Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). The Act purported to reinstate the law that existed prior 
to Wards Cove, but it may be "that Wards Coue simply created a clear majority for a position 
advocated by a plurality in Watson[;] [thus,] the question is whether the 1991 Act intend[ed] 
to overrule Watson as well as lVards Coue.• Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race 
Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act: The •Impossibility• of Permanent Reform, 45 
RUTGERS L. REv. 965, 969 n.16 (1993). 
Z1 137 CONG. REC. S15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991). However, the Bush Administration 
took the position that "[t]he bill embodies longstanding concepts or job-relatedness and 
business necessity and rejects proposed innovations. In short. it represents an nffinnation 
of existing law, including Wards Cove.• 137 CONG. REc. S15474 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991). 
The language of the 1991 Act mirrors that found in the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. V 1993). Nevertheless, Congress's official legislative 
history to the 1991 Act forbade reliance on ADA legislative history, despite statements in the 
unofficial legislative history of the 1991 Act drawing upon the ADA for meaning. Alito, 
supra note 14, at 1024 n.54; see also Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Ciuil 
Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 931 & n.48 (1993) (asserting Congress 
deliberately left open possibility that 1991 Act could be used to support same result achieved 
in Wards Cove). 
28 Compare New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (allowing 
defendant to meet business necessity defense by showing its legitimate go::lls were 
significantly served by challenged practice) with Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) 
(requiring discriminatory practice to be necessary to job performance). 
29 But cf. Belton, supra note 27, at 930 (asserting plain meaning approach is supported 
by "built-in statutory legislative historY' forbidding reliance on any legislative history other 
than interpretive memorandum). 
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of a statistical prima facie case. 30 At this initial stage, the plain-
tiff must prove that the challenged practice "select[s] applicants for 
hire or promotion in a ... pattern significantly different from that 
of the pool of applicants."31 Once the plaintiff establishes a prima 
facie case, the employer either may disprove the existence of the 
alleged disparate impact by challenging the verity or significance 
of the plaintiffs statistics or may affirmatively prove that, despite 
the disparate impact, the practice is justified because it is "job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity."32 Should the defendant succeed by establishing the 
latter defense, the plaintiff may nevertheless prevail by introducing 
evidence that there is a less-discriminatory alternative which the 
defendant cannot successfully rebut but refuses to adopt.33 
Application of these elements to particular facts requires 
clarification of three issues. One is the overarching degree of need 
30 In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), Justice O'Connor, in a 
plurality opinion, stated that there is no hard and fast test for establishing the impact of a 
practice, but rather, courts must make this determination on a case-by-case basis. I d. at 995 
n.3. Cf. EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, 48 F.3d 549, 604·06 (1st Cir. 1995). 
31 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). In order to make this 
showing, the plaintiff must prove that (1) a discrete employer selection practice (or if no 
discrete practice is severable from the selection process, the process itselO (2) disproportion-
ately excludes people of the plaintiffs class. Whether the degree of disproportion is adequate 
to constitute "impact" is determined on a case-by-case basis. Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 n.3. 
However, one type of practice that cannot be challenged based on its disproportionate impact 
is an employer's bona fide seniority system. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 349-50 (1977) (discussing Title VII's seniority-system exception). It is 
unclear whether an employee who is a member of the racial or gender (typicnlly malo) 
majority may utilize the disparate impact theory. Perry, supra note 17, at 10 n.33. But see 
Craig v. Alabama State Univ., 804 F.2d 682, 688 (11th Cir. 1986) (recognizing impact claim 
for white male plaintiff); cf. Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 890 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. 
Ala. 1995) (apparently accepting that white males may mount disparate impact challenge). 
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993); see EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, 48 
F.3d 549, 604 (1st Cir. 1995). In Watson, a plurality of the Court concluded the defendant's 
burden at this stage was one of production rather than persuasion. Although the Court 
espoused this view the following year in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989), Congress rejected it in the 1991 Act and established the defendant's burden as ono 
of production and persuasion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m). 
33 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(kX1XAXii); see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 
(1974). It is not clear whether a defendant can escape liability entirely by adopting such an 
alternative mid-way through the litigation. See Blumoff & Lewis, The Reagan Court and 
Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1, 43 (1990). Title 
VII provides additionally for other affirmative defenses not here relevant. See 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-2(h), 2000e-11. 
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issue that Part ill of this Article addresses. The other two 
questions pertain to the relationship between business necessity 
and job-relatedness and the role of the less-discriminatory element 
of the defense. 
1. Business Necessity and Job-Relatedness. The common and 
statutory law creating the business necessity defense has developed 
a two-part test, culminating in the language of the 1991 Act: "job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity. "34 This duality raises the question of the relationship 
between business necessity and job relatedness.ss The question 
consists of two sub-issues: first, whether employer practices can be 
defended as necessary to the business even though they are not job-
related; and second, whether the business necessity defense can 
insulate practices that are job-related, even though the job itself is 
34 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
35 Belton, supra note 27, at 931-32 (positing Court has not definitively answered question 
of whether terms "job related" and "business necessity'" are alternative characteriultions of 
same standard or are different standards); cf. Brodin, supra note 14, at 340 (noting in Griggs, 
"Court .•. left unexplained whether business necessity, described as the 'touchstone' of Title 
vn, is a separate form of justification, or merely another descriptive phrase for job relation• 
(citations omitted)). But see Alfred W. Blumrosen, Socil!ly in Tta11Sition m: Justice 
O'Connor and the Destabilization of the Griggs Principle of Employment Discrimination, 13 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 53, 56 n.25 (1991) (asserting business necessity standard requires 
"rigorous review of employer practices, protecting only those [practices] with disparate 
impact which are objectively important{,]• whereas job-relatedness standard •accepts the 
existing order"'); Gary A. Moore & :Michael K. Braswell, •Quotas• and the Codification of the 
Disparate Impact Theory: What did Griggs Really Say and Not Say1, 55 ALB. L. REv. 459, 
481 (1991) (suggesting job-relatedness and business necessity nrc necessarily contradictory 
standards); Philip S. Runkel, Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Continuation of the 
Wards Cove Standard of Business Necessity?, 35 WM & .MARY L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1994) 
(suggesting Griggs standard treatsjob-relatedness and business necessity as independently 
sufficient alternatives); Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit lt1, 1995 WIS. L. REv. 
507, 523 (arguing Griggs business necessity and job-relatedness lnnguago is contradictory). 
An earlier version of the 1991 Act would have divided challenged practices into two 
categories: those pertaining to employee selection, which had to bear •a significant 
relationship to the successful performance of the job,• and those not related to selection, 
which had to bear "a significant relationship to a manifest business objective of the 
employer.• H.R. CONF. REP. No. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H9552 (daily 
ed. Oct. 12, 1990). 
Although Professor Belton argues against a two-step business necessity analysis, the strict, 
BFOQ-type standard he advocates in fact lends itself to the two steps in question-looking 
at the relationship between the requirement and the task to be performed; and looking at 
the relationship between the task to be performed and the ultimate purpose or nature of the 
business. See Belton, supra note 27, at 937 (discussing analytical steps ofBFOQ). 
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not shown to be essential to the business. 
The language and purpose of the 1991 Act suggest that job-
relatedness and business-necessity are both required and should be 
treated as two facets of the same requirement. Supreme Court and 
congressional choice of conjunctive language to join the two 
elements counsels in favor of requiring that both elements be met 
if the two can logically work together. The two can work together. 
In fact, the business necessity analysis actually lends itself more 
readily to a dual requirement than to an either-or approach. 
In order for the job-related requirement to constrain employers 
at all, it must incorporate a necessity requirement. Thus, the 
employer that demonstrates that a practice measures the ability to 
do particular tasks must also establish that the task in question is 
necessary to the ultimate business goal sought and that the 
ultimate goal is essential to the business. 36 If this interpretation 
were not imposed, employers would be able to prevail by submitting 
as evidence job definitions incorporating tasks for which the 
challenged practice accurately measured, even though performance 
of the tasks was not necessary to the business. 
On the other hand, there cannot logically be a showing of 
business necessity without job-relatedness. In order to be "neces-
sary," a practice must somehow measure the worker's ability to 
perform some function (broadly defined) that the employer wants 
done. Perhaps the employer defines the job to include the "task" or 
"function" of "contributing to the appearance of a well-educated 
work force." To create that appearance, then, is a "task" that the 
employer has assigned, just as much as a more mechanical function 
would be. In either case, the employer must demonstrate both that 
the practice accurately measures for the ability to create the 
desired appearance and that creation of that appearance is 
36 Cf. Belton, supra note 27, at 932 (positing "job-relatedness is simply one way an 
employer can prove business necessity"). But cf. Cynthia L. Alexander, Note, The Defeat of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wading Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 
V AND. L. REV. 595, 599 (1991) (suggesting Supreme Court has equated business necessity 
with job-relatedness and job-relatedness is established by showing practice is necessary to 
business). Professor Belton further argues that the unified business necessity/job-relatedness 
test established in Griggs was unnecessarily bifurcated by the 1991 Act's language, 
compelling an initial inquiry into job-relatedness followed by an inquiry into the necessity 
of the practice. Belton, supra note 27, at 936. 
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essential to the business. 37 
2. Less· Discriminatory Alternative. The statutorily created role 
for the less·discriminatory alternative provides important informa-
tion about the contours of the defense. The codification of the less-
discriminatory alternative element confirms that the "necessity" 
required by the Act to establish the defense is true necessity, rather 
than mere efficacy. Under the terms of the 1991 Act, a practice 
cannot successfully be defended as "necessary" if a less-discrimina-
tory alternative is available. Because the Act requires employers 
to adopt the least discriminatory alternative, the Act permits 
retention of only those practices that are essential to the busi-
ness.38 
In addition, the codification clarifies the order of proof that 
applies in impact cases. It suggests that the defendant's burden is 
not initially to prove absolute necessity, but something less. 
Because the 1991 Act refers only to those less-discriminatory 
alternatives which the plaintiff introduces, the Act stops short of 
imposing on the defendant the burden of showing initially that all 
conceivable less discriminatory alternatives are unworkable.39 
The defendant should be put to the task of showing that such 
alternatives are unworkable and thus that the challenged practice 
is essential only after the plaintiff has introduced evidence of less-
discriminatory alternatives. At the outset, then, the defendant 
must show simply that the practice significantly and efficiently 
achieves an essential goal. 
Some courts and commentators would absolve the defendant of 
having to adopt less·discriminatory alternatives that are deemed 
37 Because any job may be defmed in such a way that any desired employee ability or 
trait is incorporated into the job description, the element of job-relatedness should form n 
part of every business necessity analysis. 
38 The "less discriminatory alternative• language thus supports my contention that the 
business necessity defense requires the employer to show its proctico iB essential, rather 
than merely effective. However, the language lends support only at the choice-of-proctico 
level of the business necessity analysis, and not at the necessity-of-the-goal level, which is 
a far more difficult issue. See infra notes 3&45 and accompanying text (discussing levels of 
business necessity analysis). 
39 See Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Appi'Oadl ro Disparate Impad and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 72 OR. L. REv. 253, 319 (1993) (discussing EEOC Uniform Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1992) and arguing that. requiring 
particularized validation studies from every employer as contemplated by Guidelines is 
counterproductive). 
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overly costly.40 Although tenable at one time, this position 
currently poses problems. 41 As explained in the next section, 
parallels between business necessity analysis and disparate 
treatment analysis demonstrate that the defenses available under 
the two schemes should be treated comparably. The Supreme 
Court's decision in International Union, UA W v. Johnson Controls, 
Inc. suggested, in the context of disparate treatment and its BFOQ 
defense, that the expense of eliminating a discriminatory practice 
must be ignored with the possible exception of where the expense 
would threaten the very survival of the defendant's business.42 If 
the BFOQ and business necessity defenses are comparable, then, 
at most only ruinous costs may be invoked in support of the 
business necessity defense as well.43 
40 See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality 
opinion) (permitting consideration of costs and other burdens of proposed less-discriminatory 
alternative practices in deciding whether such alternatives are "equally effective" as 
challenged practice in serving employer's legitimate business goals); Note, Business Necessity 
Under Title VII of the Ciuil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 
114-15 (197 4) [hereinafter Note, A No-Alternative Approach] (advocating "not insubstantial" 
test, requiring employers to adopt proposed alternative if cost difference between it and 
current discriminatory practice is "insubstantial"). But see Brodin, supra note 14, at 353-54 
& n.203 (discussing cost-based defense when economic risks are at stake); Note, The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 and Less Discriminatory Alternatives in Disparate Impact Litigation, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1625-26 (1993) (contending that cost-based defenses should be rejected 
in disparate impact context). 
41 It is frequently argued that employers will be caught in a quandary: facing liability 
for unlawful affirmative action if they adopt quotas, facing liability for unlawful impact 
discrimination if they do not. See, e.g., Moore & Braswell, supra note 35, at 470. Given Title 
VII's primary goal of ending discrimination against those who have historically been victims 
of discrimination, it is appropriate to construe the Act in a way that yields affirmative action 
liability, rather than impact liability if some type of liability cannot be avoided. See, e.g., 
Donald 0. Johnson, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Disparate Impact: The Response to 
Factionalism, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469, 472-73 (1992) (discussing history of discrimination 
that Title VII was intended to end). The law should be interpreted in a way that will cause 
employers to err on the side of including traditionally excluded groups. 
42 499 U.S. 187,210-11 (1991); see also EEOC: Policy Guide on Supreme Court's Johnson 
Controls Decision, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:6941, 6943 n.7 (June 28, 1991) (suggesting 
Johnson Controls decided costs could not support BFOQ defense). But see MICHAEL J. 
ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 441-42 (3d ed. 1994) 
(noting Court in Johnson Controls reserved issue of whether "costs .•• so prohibitive as to 
threaten survival of the employer's business" might justify BFOQ). 
43 See generally ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 42, at 440-42 (discussing role of cost 
justification in employer defenses); Brodin, supra note 14 (same). 
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3. Summary of Business Necessity Analysis. The elements an 
employer must demonstrate to establish the business necessity 
defense are: 
(1) the ultimate business goal which the employer seeks to 
achieve through the practice is essential to the business;44 
(2) the tasks for which the practice measures ability are 
essential to achievement of that ultimate business goal; 
(3) workers selected for the positions in question must be 
able to perform the tasks; and 
( 4) the practice selected is necessary to measure the ability 
to perform those tasks. 
The analysis may be depicted as follows with each arrow 
indicating a point at which the employer must establish that the 
occurrence on the bottom is necessary to the occurrence immediate-
ly above: 
'"But cf. Marcus B. Chandler, Comment, The Business Necusity Defense to Disparate-
Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911, 934 (1979) (arguing employer's good 
faith belief in need for its goal should establish adequacy of goal nod only relation of practice 
to achievement of stated goal should be assessed). 
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Thus, depending on the vagaries of the particular case, the 
employer must show that the practice measures ability to perform 
a task, which measurement assures that employees selected will be 
capable of performing the task, which ability to perform assures 
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that the task will, indeed, be performed, and so on. These elements 
may be divided into two categories. At the top is the ultimate 
business goal asserted by the employer and the arrow connecting 
it with the business's survival. With respect to this element, this 
Article posits that achievement of the goal must be truly essential 
to the continued viability of the business rather than simply 
beneficial to the business. The second category of elements 
(represented by all other arrows in the chart) consists of all of the 
sub-elements pertaining to the challenged practice and the traits 
it seeks to measure. With respect to such intermediate goals and 
the relationships between the practice and these goals, this Article 
similarly advocates a strict necessity showing, but suggests that the 
defendant's unrebutted demonstration that the practice significant-
ly and efficiently achieves the ultimate goal may create a presump-
tion that the practice is essential to the goal's achievement. Only 
when the plaintiff introduces evidence of the availability of less-
discriminatory alternatives, as described in the 1991 Act, must the 
defendant demonstrate why retaining the more discriminatory 
alternative is essential to the business. 45 If the defendant adopts 
the practice identified by the plaintiff as a less-discriminatory 
alternative, the defendant may avert liability under the terms of 
the 1991 Act. 
ill. WHY THE PRACTICE MUST BE CRUCIAL TO THE 
EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS 
As stated above, arguments opposed to a strict necessity 
requirement rely on two rationales. One is that distinctions 
between disparate treatment cases and disparate impact cases 
warrant a lighter defense burden in the latter. The other is that 
a balancing test comports with the goals of Title VII better than a 
strict necessity test does. The remainder of the Article examines 
the assumptions underlying these two positions. 
45 But see Greenberger, supra note 39, at 320 (arguing employers should be required to 
show affirmatively that they have conducted survey of nlternatives as pnrt of business 
necessity proof); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Undo Title VII: An Objec.liue Theory 
of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1327 (1987). 
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A. IMPACT AND TREATMENT-ANALOGIES AND CONTRASTS 
1. Disparate Treatment Analysis. Unlike disparate impact 
discrimination, which may result inadvertently from a seemingly 
benign practice, disparate treatment discrimination entails adverse 
employer decisionmaking actually motivated by an employee's 
membership in a Title VII-protected class.46 For this reason, 
disparate treatment is often called "intentional" discrimination. 47 
There are three types of disparate treatment cases: (1) individual 
inferential proof cases, using the burden-shifting scheme adopted 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green;48 (2) group (or systemic) 
inferential proof cases, using statistics to establish that the 
employer engages in a system-wide "pattern and practice" of 
discrimination;49 and (3) direct evidence cases, in which an 
individual or group plaintiff establishes discriminatory intent 
through direct evidence, either in the form of an overt (admitted) 
discriminatory practice or through direct evidence regarding the 
defendant's motives or state of mind. 50 
46 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) 
(explaining differences between impact and treatment cases). 
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating based on "race, color, religion, sox, or 
national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e·2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). While the business necessity 
defense is available in impact cases involving any of the five prohibited categories of 
discrimination, the BFOQ defense is not available in treatment cases involving race or color. 
Id. § 2000e-2(eX1). 
47 See infra notes 60· 70 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of intent and motive 
in Title VII context). 
48 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also infra note 52 (providing factors required to establish 
prima facie case). 
49 E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In 
explaining why it is permissible to infer discriminatory intent based on statistical disparities, 
the Teamsters Court stated, "[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that 
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less 
representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from 
which employees are hired." I d. at 33940 n.20. The disparity established by the plaintiffs 
statistics in a systemic treatment case is greater than that needed to establish discrimination 
in an impact case. Id. at 339 n.20. 
50 E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see infra notes 71-74 and 
accompanying text (discussing Court's treatment of employer's state·of·mind in St. Mary's 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks). There is not a clear demarcation between direct evidence and "high 
quality circumstantial evidence." Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate 
Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2321 n.290 (1995); Charles Sullivan, 
Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment After Title VII, 56 BROOK. 
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In a direct-evidence treatment case, the ultimate issue of 
discrimination turns simply on whether the plaintiff's direct 
evidence of discrimination is more persuasive than the defendant's 
countervailing evidence. In an individual inferenial case, by 
contrast, the Court has developed a burden-shifting scheme to 
assist the factfinder in resolving the ultimate issue of discrimina-
tion. 51 In such cases, the McDonnell Douglas scheme requires the 
plaintiff to persuade the factfinder that four specific facts exist. 
Proof of these four facts creates a presumption of discrimination. 62 
A burden of production then shifts to the defendant to offer a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision. 63 If the 
defendant meets its burden of production, the plaintiff may then 
submit evidence that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual. 
The factfinder considers all of this evidence in deciding whether the 
plaintiff in an individual inferential case has proven the ultimate 
fact of discrimination. If a pattern-and-practice plaintiff, by 
contrast, mounts an adequately strong statistical case that his 
L. REv. 1107, 1118-19 (1991). 
51 
"''tis unrealistic •.• to require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the 
actual subjective intent of the decisionmaker ••.. " WashingU>n v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing plaintiff's difficulty in proving employer intent 
when challenging selection practice). 
52 The four elements that comprise this "prima facie case• are nB follows: (1) the plaintiff 
is a member of a Title Vll-protected group; (2) the plaintiff applied and WSB qualified for a 
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite the plaintiff's qualifications, 
she was rejected; and (4) after her rejection, the position remnined open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons with the plaintifi's qunlifications. McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Of course, the specific facts fnlling within each of the elements 
will vary, depending on the circumstances of the plaintiff's case. I d. 
The Teamsters Court further elucidated the nature of the prima facie case, explaining: 
[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of 
discrimination, [but} it does demand that the alleged discriminates 
demonstrate at least that his rejection did not result from the two most 
common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a 
job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence 
of a vacancy in the job sought. Elimination of these reasons for the 
refusal to hire is sufficient, absent other explanation, to create an 
inference that the decision was a discriminatory one. 
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44. 
53 By placing a burden of production on the defendant, the defendant is compelled to 
introduce evidence sufficient to permit an inference of the fact it is attempting to prove. This 
is a lesser burden than the burden of persuasion, which means that if the defendant failg to 
prove the existence of the fact at issue, the plaintiff immediately prevails. 
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group is underrepresented in the defendant's workplace, the 
defendant typically responds by challenging the statistics rather 
than by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. 54 
Whether the fact of disparate treatment discrimination is 
established with direct or inferential evidence, the defendant is 
liable for that discrimination unless the defendant proves, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of facts supporting an 
affirmative defense. 55 For purposes of the present discussion, the 
only relevant treatment-based affll'Illative defense is the bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ). 56 The BFOQ defense succeeds 
64 See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 342 n.24 (holding general statements that defendant hired 
best-qualified applicants insufficient to rebut prima facie case of systemic discrimination); 
cf. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1977) (noting defendant may 
also respond by showing that racial disparities revealed in plaintiffs statistics are result of 
discrimination occurring prior to enactment of Title VII). But see EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding defendant's informal evidence that women were 
less interested than men in holding certain sales positions was sufficient to rebut Agency's 
statistical prima facie case). 
65 This aspect of disparate treatment presents an anomaly. When an employer 
implements an overtly discriminatory practice, such as the open exclusion of all women, a 
BFOQ defense is readily available as a defense. However, when the employer, perhaps 
inadvertently, treats an employee adversely because of her sex, the BFOQ defense-though 
theoretically available-is unlikely to help the employer. This renders overt discrimination 
more easily defensible than negligent discrimination. Of course, if the plaintiff establishes 
in the course of an inferential case that the employer indeed did exclude her based on her 
sex, the employer can, in theory, invoke the BFOQ to argue that women cannot do the job. 
The Court's holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), suggested the 
availability of an additional affirmative defense. In Price Waterhouse, the Majority held that 
a defendant could avoid liability entirely by proving that legitimate reasons would have 
compelled the defendant to make the same adverse decision even in the absence of the 
discriminatory reason. Id. at 237. However, the 1991 Civil Rights Act eliminated the 
availability of this affirmative defense. Under the Act, the defendant's proof that it would 
have made the same decision absent its discrimination limits the remedies for which tho 
defendant may be held liable, but does not serve as an absolute defense. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(m) (Supp. V 1993). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(eX1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In fact, in the context of raco 
discrimination, the BFOQ defense is not even available. Interestingly, prior to the Court's 
decision in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991), some lower 
courts had suggested that the business necessity defense applied to both disparate impact 
and disparate treatment cases. E.g., Hayes v. Shelby Mem. Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 
1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). 
Another affirmative defense to disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII is a 
bona fide affirmative action program. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.l93 (1979) 
(holding affl11llative action program did not violate Title VII). Because this defense applies 
only where the employer's action is predicated on an express policy recognizing the existence 
of discrimination, it has no analog in the disparate impact context. 
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only when the employer establishes that "the essence of the 
business operation would be undermined by [not hiring members 
outside of the plaintiff's protected group]."57 To establish this 
defense, the employer might prove, for example, (1) that only men 
can perform the central tasks of the job and (2) that the perfor-
mance of the tasks which require a male-only workforce are crucial 
to the essence of the employer's business. 58 The BFOQ defense, 
then, is available only where an employer's business could not 
operate at all if it were forced to include the plaintift's protected 
group.59 In the BFOQ context, "necessary" means "essential." 
The following chart sets forth a simplified synopsis of the various 
types of analysis used in Title VII cases to facilitate comparisons 
between them: 
67 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cut. denied, 404 U.S. 950 
(1971). 
58 To show that only people of one sex can do the job, the employer may show that there 
is "reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially 
all [members of the excluded sex] would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties 
ofthejob involved." Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228,235 (5th Cir.1969). 
Wl1.son v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981), demonstrates the 
meaning of "essence of the business." The Wilson court rejected a contention by the 
defendant airline that the essence of its business entailed using only female flight attendants 
who would appeal to male passengers, concluding instead that the essence of an airline's 
business is transporting passengers. Id. at 302. 
59 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210; see supra note 42. But see id. at 216-17 (White, J .• 
concurring) (proposing lighter employer burden when asserting safety·based defense to 
treatment claim). 
H
e
i
n
O
n
l
i
n
e
 
-
-
 
3
0
 
G
a
.
 
L
.
 
R
e
v
.
 
4
0
6
 
1
9
9
5
-
1
9
9
6
STAGE IN 
ANALYSIS-+ 
TYPE OF CASE .£ 
IMPACT 
SYSTEMIC TREATMENT 
INFERENTIAL 
INDMDUAL TREAT· 
MENT: 
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS 
INFERENTIAL 
INDMDUAL 
TREATMENT: 
DIRECT 
DISPARATE IMPACT AND DISPARATE TREATMENT DISCRIMINATION: 
STEPS IN THE ANALYSIS 
PLAlNTIFF'S PRIMA FA· DEFENDANTS REDUT- ADDinONAL PROOF DEFENDANTS AFFIRMA· PLAINTIFF'S LAST 
CIECASE TAL FROM PLAINTIFF ON TIVE DEFENSE-ONCE WORD 
QUESTION OF DlSCRIMI· DISCRIMINATION IS 
NATION PROVED 
STATISTICS SHOWING NO DISPARATE IMPACT PROVE: PRACTICE IS LESS RESTRICTIVE 
FACIALLY NEUTRAL (OVERCOME PLAIN· JOB RELATED AND CON· ALTERNATIVES 
PRAcriCE HAS DISPRO· TIFF"S INFERENCE OF SISTENT WlTH BUS!· 
POimONATE IMPACT IMPACT BY CHALLENG· NESS NECESSITY 
ING STATISTICS) 
STATISTICS AND DI· OVERCOME INFERENCE PROVE: DISCRIMINATO- [PHASE TWO OF SUIT: 
RECT EVIDENCE CREAT· OF DISCRIMINATION BY RY CHARACTERJSTIC IS INDMDUAL PLAINTIFF 
ING INFERENCE THAT CHALLENGING STATJS. BFOQ ESTABLISHES MEM· 
DJSCRIMINATION lS OC- TICS BERSHIP IN CLASS 
CURRJNG SYSTEMATI· AND INDMDUAL 
CALLY HARMJ 
PLAlNTIFF, MEMBER OF LEGinMATE, NON·DIS- SHOW PRETEXT-PROVE PROVE: DISCIUMINATO-
PROTECTED GROUP, CRIMINATORY REASON THE ULTIMATE lSSUE RY CHARACTERJSTIC IS 
APPLIED FOR OPEN (PRODUCTION BURDEN OF MOTIVE BFOQ 
POSITION, WAS REJECT· ONLY) 
ED, AND JOB STAYED 
OPEN 
OVERTLY DISCRIMINA· SHOW OVERTLY DIS- PROVE: DISClUMINATO-
TORY PRACTICE OR CRIMINATORY PRAC.. RY CH.ARACTERJSTIC IS 
DIRECI' EVIDENCE OF TICE NOT IN EXISTENCE BFOQ 
DISCRIMINATORY ANI· OR OVl::RCOME INFER-
MUS ENCE OF DJSCRIMJNA. 
TORY A.NUdUS 
IJ:::o.. 
0 
en 
&3 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
&; 
~ 
~ 
~ 
r-" 
c.o 
0 
c;, 
(X) 
'! 
1996] BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE 407 
2. The Discriminator's State of Mind in Impact and Treatment 
Cases: No Rewards for Benign Intent. Commentators have used 
the differences between impact and treatment analysis to support 
arguments that the stringent level of business need required to 
establish the BFOQ defense in disparate treatment cases is greater 
than the level of need required to establish the business necessity 
defense in impact cases. They argue that treatment defendants 
have discriminated "intentionally" and are therefore more culpable 
than impact defendants, who have merely employed facially neutral 
practices. 60 This distinction is not accurate. 61 Disparate treat-
ment does not necessarily entail any greater culpable intent than 
the typical impact case.62 If employer culpability is to be the 
measure, then the same strict necessity standard that controls in 
the BFOQ context should apply to the business necessity defense 
in impact cases as well. 63 
60 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 17, at 60.S2 (noting disparate impact is viewed as less 
objectionable than disparate treatment; harm to employees resulting from impact is less wide 
spread than harm resulting from treatment; potential for hnrm to employers is greater if 
facially neutral policy is eliminated than if overtly disaiminatory policy is eliminated; and 
for these reasons the BFOQ defense imposes stricter standard). 
61 See Belton, supra note 27, at 938 (discussing close relationship between BFOQ and 
business necessity test and advocating that courts treat them similarly). 
62 There are other problems with viewing discrimination liability from 11 culpability 
standpoint. There is a growing need to see employment discrimination lnw less as 11 system 
for catching "bad" decisionmakers and more as a system for encouraging declsionmakers, 
specifically those with the power to impose systemic changes, to think about how to create 
employment structures that will foster substantive equality. Martha Chnmallas, 
Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary 
Influences, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2370, 2398 (1994) (stating that employer would be held liable 
if it failed to guard against stereotyping); cf. Perry, supra note 17, at 57--60 & n.294 
(asserting impact- and treatment-based discrimination are essentinlly indistinguishable); 
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987) (concluding discrimino.tory animus 
is unnecessary to establish liability in treatment-based claim). But see Personnel Adm'r v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,272 (1979) (holding Equal Protection Clause of Constitution imposes 
no liability unless purpose of discrimination is to harm women). An impact case is as likely 
to entail "intent" to discriminate as a treatment case; even tho Court has recognized that 
impact analysis is sometimes used to "get at" intentionnl discrimination that can not be 
effectively proved through treatment analysis. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 
u.s. 977, 990 (1988). 
63 See Brodin, supra note 14, at 358 (noting Griggs recognized "'employers co.n do o..s much 
harm to minorities and women by unintentional acts as they can by acts designed to 
discriminate •••. Given the equation of purposeful discrimination and practices which are 
its functional equivalent, the affirmative defenses in both types of lawsuits should be 
substantially similar."); Perry, supra note 17, at 56 (arguing same standards should apply 
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Arguments to the contrary, predicated on the idea that the 
stricter standard is appropriate when a defendant is shown to have 
discriminated intentionally, misunderstand the concept of intent in 
Title VII doctrine. For purposes of Title VII, an employer inten-
tionally discriminates when, for example, it treats a woman 
differently from how it would treat a similarly situated man.64 
"Intent to discriminate" will be found even if the employer is not 
aware that it is motivated by discrimination. The employer's 
discrimination (and perhaps some underlying prejudice against the 
protected group) may be entirely unconscious but is nevertheless 
deemed disparate treatment (that is, intentional) discrimination for 
Title VII purposes. 65 Title VII, then, requires neither that the 
employer intend to treat the employee differently because of her sex 
nor that the employer realize its decision was actually motivated by 
sex.66 
In reality, the distinctions in culpability drawn between the 
impact and treatment analyses have more to do with imprecise 
in BFOQ and business necessity defenses). In fact, the EEOC and courts have stated that 
the BFOQ defense is available primarily in situations in which the defendant excludes a 
protected group because the defendant requires the physical or biological characteristics of 
the other group. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1995) (outlining sex discrimination guidelines}. Thus, 
for example, the BFOQ defense is available to an employer who excludes women if the 
employer's business is to maintain a sperm bank. 
64 The standard in treatment cases is simply whether the plaintiff would have received 
the same treatment had she been of a different race or sex. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); Alfred 
W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of 
Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 67, 69 (1972}. This concept of discrimina· 
tion, described as "equal protection" discrimination, permits the inference of an unlawful 
purpose or motive to be drawn from differential treatment. International Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977). 
65 As Professor Lawrence has noted: 
Freudian theory states that the human mind defends itself against the 
discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, 
wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what the individual has learned is 
good or right. While our historical experience has made racism an 
integral part of our culture, our society has more recently embraced an 
ideal that rejects racism as immoral. When an individual experiences 
conflict between racist ideas and the societal ethic that condemns those 
ideas, the mind excludes his racism from consciousness. 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (1987). 
66 Lukens Steel, 482 U.S. at 669. But see Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278-79 (requiring initial 
finding of intent to harm protected group in order to establish equal protection violation). 
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language used in discussions of the treatment doctrine than with 
any true differences between the two approaches. 67 What courts 
actually require in Title VII disparate treatment cases is not 
properly denominated "intent" at all, but is instead "motive." 
"Motive," as Professor Don Welch explains, "is the underlying 
[possibly unconscious] cause or reason moving an agent to action 
... , [whereas] [i]ntent is the conscious purpose with which one acts 
to effect a desired goal or result. nOS 
Professor Welch demonstrates that courts and commentators 
have confused the concepts of intent and motive in the Title VII 
context. He confirms that the actual test applied in Title VII 
disparate treatment cases has been a test of motive, although it has 
been called one of intent.69 Because the "intent" requirement in 
disparate treatment cases does not necessarily entail culpability at 
all, it does not serve as a means for distinguishing between 
treatment-based and impact-based discrimination.70 
67 Cf. Michael J. Zimmer, Teamsters: Redefinition and Retrenchment of Concepts of 
Discrimination, 30 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 51 (1977) (asserting Title VII equal·b'eatment 
analysis does not involve question of intent). 
68 D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment 
Analysis on Motive Rather than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 733, 738 (1987) (emphasis added). 
Professor Welch further notes: 
Motive is a causal concept. It comes into play when a concern exists 
that decisions were made "because of" or •on the grounds of" certain 
factors. Motive addresses reasons for actions, realities thnt shape and 
influence actions, regardless of whether the actor is fully aware of these 
realities. Intent, on the other hand, is a state of awareness concept. An 
actor's intent speaks to the purpose that is being consciously pur-
sued-the goals one has in mind as choices are being made. 
Id. at 739. 
69 ld. at 763-72. Welch furthers asserts that a test of motive, rather than one of intent, 
is appropriate in the Title VII context. Id. at 775-78. The 1991 Act has confirmed this view 
in the mixed-motives context, stating that •an unlawful employment practice is established 
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex. or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993). 
10 Both systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact are based on a statistical 
demonstration of discrimination. Arguably. though, courts require statistical significance to 
establish a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment, but not estnblish a prima facie 
case of disparate impact. Compare International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977) (stressing, in systemic dispnrnte treatment case, the importance 
of statistical analysis in Title VII cases) wUh Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 
977, 995 n.3 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating, in dispnrote-impact case, thnt no 
particular test of statistical significance is required in Title VII cases). This difference may 
410 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:387 
The Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks71 potentially increases the amount of evidence a plaintiff 
must introduce on the question of motive, but does nothing to 
diminish the claim that treatment may be established without a 
showing of conscious intent. In Hicks, the Court rejected the view 
that a disparate treatment plaintiff who proves that the defendant's 
proffered reason is not the true reason for the defendant's action 
automatically prevails. 72 Thus, the Hicks decision permits, but 
does not require, the factfinder to conclude that the lying defendant 
has discriminated. 73 Although for some plaintiffs Hicks increases 
the difficulty of establishing motive, it does not alter, or in any way 
add to, the definition of discrimination. Discrimination continues 
to be defined as differential treatment based on membership in a 
protected class. 74 If employer consciousness of the reasons for its 
treatment was not a requirement before Hicks, neither is it a 
requirement afterwards. 
3. Disparities in Remedies Available for Impact and Treatment 
Cases. Linda Hamilton Krieger carries Welch's intent/motive 
distinction one step further.76 She suggests that, because the 
levels of culpability in impact and treatment cases are often 
indistinguishable, the remedies available in the two types of cases 
create the impression that treatment cases involve greater culpability, but this is not 
necessarily correct. Cf. Thomas v. Metroflight, 814 F.2d 1506, 1510·11 n.4 (lOth Cir. 1987) 
(requiring plaintiff to show statistical significance in order to establish prima facio impact 
case). Even if the prima facie systemic-treatment case requires statistical significance and 
the prima facie impact case does not, the fact remains that any employer "intent" to 
discriminate that can be inferred from the plaintiffs systemic-treatment case may well be 
an intent unknown to the defendant, which is to say the defendant lacks motive. 
71 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). 
72 Id. at 2751 ("[N]othing in law would permit us to substitute for the required finding 
that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination, the much different 
(and much lesser) finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not believable."). 
73 Deborah A Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic 
Assumption, 26 CoNN. L. REV. 997, 998 (1994); Malamud, supra note 50, at 2254. 
7
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987); 
see also ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 42, at 110 (noting Court's decisions suggest it does not 
believe most discrimination is animus-based). 
75 Linda H. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach lo 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995). 
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should be the same. 76 
Such a conflation of the two types of cases for remedial purposes 
would represent a change of direction from the 1991 Act, which 
added levels to the remedial hierarchy to include additional 
compensation for willful offenses. The current structure appears 
as follows: 
Disparate Impact: equitable relief, including non-compensa-
tory monetary damages;77 
Disparate Treatment (non-willful): equitable relief and 
compensatory damages; 
Disparate Treatment (willful): equitable relief and compen-
satory damages; 
Disparate Treatment (malicious or reckless disregard of 
rights): equitable relief, compensatory damages, and 
punitive damages.78 
Professor Robert Belton apparently would agree with Krieger. In 
response to the distinctions drawn by the 1991 Act, Professor 
Robert Belton has stated: 
The exclusion of disparate impact ... claims [from 
those for which compensatory and punitive damages 
are available] has the effect of creating first- and 
second-class cases of unlawful discrimination. Even 
76 I d. at 1243. Krieger would bifurcate the remedy scheme at a different point than that 
chosen by Congress. Although Krieger argues that similarities in the level of culpability 
between impact and systemic-treatment cases call for a reduction of systemic-treatment 
remedies, it may be more logical to ilu:rease the remedies available to impact plaintiffs. See 
infra. note 80 and accompanying text (explaining that given purposes ofTitle VII, defendant 
in impact case should not be faced with less-drastic remedies). 
71 Back pay, for example, is available in disparate impact cases. Albemnrle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511 (3d. Cir. 1988), cert. granted 
and judgment vacated, 109 S. Ct. 3151 {1989). 
78 The 1991 Civil Rights Act adds compensatory and punitive damages to the equitable 
relief Title VII has always allowed. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (Supp. V 1993). Compensatory 
damages are available only in cases of intentional (that is, disparate treatment) discrimina-
tion. Id. Moreover, punitive damages are restricted to disparate treatment cases in which 
the employer "engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice 
or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved indi .. idual.'" 
I d. 
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though [their] exclusion was deemed necessary to 
reach a compromise bill, there is no principled basis 
on which to distinguish disparate impact . . . and 
disparate treatment cases when a plaintiff has 
proven that she has been the victim of unlawful 
discrimination. . . . The unfairness [of this distinc-
tion] is underscored by the fact that Congress has 
not made the same distinction between disparate 
impact and disparate treatment in cases not involv-
ing employment. 79 
Although both Krieger and Belton both suggest that similarities 
between treatment and impact warrant conflation of the remedies 
for the two, Krieger's rationale could actually support the conclu-
sion that the impact defendant should bear a lighter justification 
burden than the treatment defendant. Krieger advocates propor-
tionality between the level of culpability and the scope of the 
remedy available in Title VII cases. If, as this Article contends, 
there should also be proportionality between the level of culpability 
and the degree of need required to justify the employer's action, 
then there must also be a correlation between the scope of the 
remedy available under Title VII and the level of need required to 
justify the practice. The gap which the 1991 Act created between 
remedies available in treatment and those available in impact cases 
could be argued to indicate congressional perception of differences 
in culpability levels between the two types of cases, which could 
then be argued to call for requiring different levels of justification 
in the two types of cases. In fact, however, the 1991 Act's bifurca-
tion of remedies actually weighs in favor of strengthening the 
business necessity defense, bringing it more in line with the level 
of business exigency required by the BFOQ defense. In treatment 
cases, courts may rely on the specter of compensatory and punitive 
damages to assure that the defendants will be motivated to defend 
their actions. Because a losing defendant in an impact case faces 
considerably less-drastic remedies than a comparable defendant in 
a treatment case, the proof structure itself must be relied upon 
more heavily to assure the defendant is forced to defend the 
79 Belton, supra note 27, at 948-49. 
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practice. 80 
4. Confusion of Business Necessity with the Legitimate, Nondis-
criminatory Reason in Treatment Cases. Just as some arguments 
for requiring a lighter demonstration of business necessity have 
rested on perceived differences between impact and treatment 
cases, other arguments have turned on perceived similarities 
between the two. Beginning early in the development of the 
disparate impact doctrine, and culminating in the Wards Cove case, 
some judges have analogized the business necessity defense not to 
the BFOQ, but to the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason phase 
of treatment cases.81 The confusion centered on two issues. The 
first issue was whether the defendant's burden in establishing 
business necessity was one of production comparable to the 
articulation or production of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
in the disparate treatment context.82 This issue was resolved by 
the 1991 Act, which established that the employer's business-
necessity burden is one of persuasion. 83 The second issue, not 
resolved by the 1991 Act, concerns whether any distinction exists 
between the content of a qualifying successful legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason and the content of a business necessity 
defense.84 Purporting to apply the "business necessity" standard, 
80 Such reliance is consistent with the twofold purpose of the Title Vll remedial scheme: 
(1) "to serve as a 'spur or catalyst' to cause employers 'to self-examine and to self-evaluate 
their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges• 
of discrimination"; and (2) compensation for injuries. McKennon v. Nashville Bunner 
Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405, 417-18 (1975)). 
81 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia, 490 U.S. 662, 659 (1989) (employer carries 
burden of producing evidence of a business justification). Dothnrd v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 
321, 339-40 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (describing impact defendant's burden as one 
of production and citing McDonnell Douglas). But see Note, A No-AltenuJtiue Approach, 
supra note 40, at 109 (describing defendant's burden as one of persuasion). 
82 See Malamud, supra note 73, at 2264-66 (discussing Court's efforts to pre .. ·ent stricter 
business necessity defense from being incorporated into McDonnell Douglas concept of 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason). 
83 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (Supp. V 1993). 
84 See. e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 570-71 (1978) (holding 
treatment analysis relied on necessity of defendant's practice of not hiring people who, like 
plaintiff, applied at work site); cf. Chandler, supra note 44. at 934 (asserting courts should 
accept any good-faith business justification employers offer); Johnson, supra note 41, nt 495 
(stating that effectiveness of placing burden of persuasion on defendant will turn on how 
"necessity" is defined, as the 1991 Act leaves this open). 
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some courts have accepted from impact defendants any "reason-
able" business justification for practices, just as they would have 
from a treatment defendant, rather than requiring a showing of 
real need for the practice. 85 
Differences between the postures of the treatment defendant and 
the impact defendant render comparisons between legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons and business necessity inapposite. The 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason requirement asks the defen-
dant to state the reason why the defendant took the actions of 
which the plaintiffs complain. In the impact case, by contrast, by 
the time business necessity is at issue, everyone is already fully 
aware of the reason why the defendant took the actions of which 
plaintiffs complain. The defendant took those actions because of 
the facially neutral practice, a practice we may assume for present 
purposes entails no discriminatory motive and thus would easily 
qualify as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason in a treatment 
case. What the defendant must show is need for the practice. 
In looking at the issue of need for the practice, some 
courts-again-have sought a mere business justification for the 
practice, again frequently referring to the legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason context. 86 Yet, to permit the employer to prevail 
simply by proving that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for adopting the practice is to change impact analysis into a search 
for intent to discriminate. Again, impact analysis assumes the 
85 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) ("The touchstone of 
this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer's justification for his use of the chnllengcd 
practice."). 
86 EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, 48 F.3d 549, 607 (1st Cir. 1995); Graffam v. Scott 
Paper Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 398 (D. Me. 1994), affd, 60 F.3d 809 (1st Cir. 1995). A recent 
example of an age discrimination impact court apparently applying the McDonnell Douglas 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason standard to an impact case is Graffam, 870 F. Supp. at 
389. In Graffam, the district court treated the impact inquiry as a search for intent to 
discriminate. 870 F. Supp. at 398. It thus permitted the defendant to justify, in part, by 
demonstrating that there were legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the decisions against 
the individual members of the group impacted. Id. at 400, 405. Although disparate impact 
analysis is often employed in ADEA cases, the 1991 Act's modifications of the doctrine 
apparently do not extend to ADEA cases. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that 
Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1099, 1150 (1993); see also Michael C. Sloan, Comment, 
Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Will the Supreme Court 
Permit It?, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 507. 
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employer adopted the practice for legitimate nondiscriminatory 
business reason. The impact inquiry does not ask whether the 
employer had a legitimate reason for adopting the practice, but 
asks how dire the employer's need for the practice is. 
Moreover, the 1991 Act's confirmation that the defendant in an 
impact case has a burden of persuasion rather than merely a 
burden of production further signifies that such a defendant should 
likewise be required to show that its practice is a true business 
necessity. Professor Hannah Furnish has explained the distinction 
in meaning between establishment of a prima facie case in each of 
the types of claims. 87 At this stage of a treatment case, the 
plaintiff has merely raised a presumption of discrimination, which 
the defendant may rebut by merely producing evidence of a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. 88 In contrast, once a prima 
facie case of impact is established, the existence of discrimination 
is considered proven and the defendant must therefore establish an 
affirmative defense to avoid liability.89 Once discrimination has 
been established as a factual matter, the remedial purposes of Title 
VII demand that the defendant establish actual necessity, whether 
the context be treatment or impact.90 The 1991 Act's confirmation 
that the impact defendant must bear a burden of persuasion, rather 
than production, supports the conclusion that the fact of discrimi-
nation has at this juncture been established, calling for the 
defendant to establish true necessity to justify the practice. 
87 Hannah A. Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate lmpad and Disparate 
Treatment Under Title VII of the Ciuil Rights Act of 1964 A{ler Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C. 
L. REv. 419, 440-44 (1982). Her position that the defendant's burden in establishing 
business necessity is one of persuasion became law in the 1991 Act. 
88 In fact, the burden imposed on the defendant at this stage in a treatment ca.sa is so 
minimal that its reason need not even be lawful (as long as the statute violated is one other 
than that under which the claim was brought). Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 
1707 (1993). 
89 Griggs established that impact-based discrimination is no less discrimination than 
treatment-based discrimination. "{Title VII requires] the removnl ofartificinl, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate 
on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications: Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
u.s. 424, 431 (1971). 
90 But see Brodin, supra note 14, at 343 n.138 (suggesting mere business reason defense 
would be more appropriate when defendant must negate discriminatory intent, rather than 
when issue is "whether the exclusionary effect of a practice can be tolerated because the 
practice produces a more productive workforce"). 
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B. THE PROBLEMS WITH BALANCING 
1. The Types of Balancing. As an alternative to requiring 
employers to show absolute necessity for a challenged practice, 
some commentators have advocated a balancing approach to the 
business necessity defense. 91 Balancing approaches fall into two 
categories. In the first, a court assesses whether the gain the 
defendant derives from the discriminatory practice is sufficient to 
outweigh the loss of employment opportunity the practice inflicts 
on the plaintiff class. 92 Such a "sliding-scale" balancing approach 
enables "courts to correlate the likely harm to equal employment 
opportunities with the employer's justification burden on a case-by-
case basis."93 
For example, suppose a plaintiff has succeeded in establishing a 
prima facie case of impact discrimination. She has demonstrated 
that her employer's discriminatory practice excludes women at a 
rate significantly greater than the rate at which it excludes men; 
thus, she has met whatever impact test the court deems applica-
ble. 94 At this juncture, advocates of interest balancing would 
require additional scrutiny of the plaintiffs case before any burden 
is imposed on the defendant. Such scrutiny might reveal, for 
example, that the plaintiffs case is relatively weak in not identify-
ing which part of the defendant's indivisible hiring process has 
caused the impact or in not demonstrating that the impact affects 
91 E.g., Moore & Braswell, supra note 35, at 492. Such commentators recognize that tho 
present system does not involve balancing. E.g., id. Under current doctrine, a plaintiff's 
statistical showing either establishes or fails to establish a prima facie case of disparate 
impact. Once established, the burden falls on the defendant to demonstrate business 
necessity. At present, business necessity is a unitary standard and does not take into 
consideration the extent of the impact the plaintiff has established. I d.; see also infra notes 
101-102 and accompanying text (discussing type-one balancing further). 
92 See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) (holding business 
purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact), cert. dismissed, 404 
U.S. 1006 (1971); Neely v. Grenada, 438 F. Supp. 390, 407 (N.D. Miss. 1977} (same). 
93 Moore & Braswell, supra note 35, at 492. But cf. Note, A No-Alternative Approach, 
supra note 40, at 116 (rejecting balancing approach as allowing employer increases in safety 
or efficiency to be "balanced away"). 
114 The EEOC Guidelines, for example, provide for a four-fifths rule to establish disparate 
impact. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1995) (establishing minority-group selection rate less 
than four-fifths of selection rate for majority group is evidence of adverse impact}. 
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a large number of minority or female workers. 95 Even though the 
law recognizes the practice as discriminatory enough to establish 
the fact of discriminatory impact, the relative weakness of the 
plaintiffs case would, under a balancing approach, lessen the 
degree of business need the defendant must show for the practice. 
The second type of balancing disregards the plaintiffs case 
entirely once it is made, looking instead at the relationship between 
the employer's practice and its ultimate goal. Under this approach, 
the greater the importance of the goal the employer seeks to 
achieve through use of the practice, the lower the level of correla-
tion required between the practice and the goal. 96 This type of 
balancing focuses on whether an employer's strong demonstration 
of its ultimate goal offsets a weak demonstration of the practice's 
efficacy. 97 
The second type of balancing is exemplified by Spurlock u. United 
95 Moore & Braswell, supra note 35, at 492. Note, however, that Title VII does not 
mandate the drawing of an adverse inference from the plnintifi'a failure to identify the 
specific impacting practice when the process cannot be subdivided. In fnct, the 1991 Act 
specifically authorizes judicial analysis in this circumstance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(k)(1)(B)(i) 
(Supp. V 1993). There is dispute about whether Title VII rights should be deemed "group 
rights" or "individual rights." See, e.g., Pamela L. Perry, Two FaWJ of Disparate Impact 
Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 523,567 (1991) (advocating individual-rights approach); 
Julia Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: TM Application of Title VII's Disparate Impact 
TMory, 1985 U.ILL. L. REv. 869, 900-09 (same); William B. Reynolds, An Equal Opportunity 
Scorecard, 21 GA. L. REv. 1007, 1030 (1987) (same); see also .Ma.rthn Chnmallns, Euoluing 
Conceptions of Equality Uru:kr Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the 
Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REv. 305, 310 n.22 (1983). Balancing is inconsistent with 
an individual-rights approach because balancing would permit employers to escape linbility 
by showing that the number of women or minorities harmed by a proctice is relatively low, 
regardless of the extent of harm inflicted on those persons. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 
440, 452-56 (1982) (rejecting notion that employer could insulate itself from Title vn liability 
by hiring enough minorities to reach non-discriminatory "bottom line'"); c[. McKennon v. 
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1995) (stating federol employment-
discrimination policy objectives are "furthered when even a single employee establishes that 
an employer has discriminated against him or her•). 
96 See, e.g., Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1263 (6th Cir. 1981) 
(permitting lesser showing of manifest relationship between proctice and goal because goal 
was one of safety); Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216 (lOth Cir. 1973) (holding 
employer's burden to demonstrate job-relatedness of employment criteria varies with skills 
required for job and consequences of hiring unqualified people). 
97 See infra notes 137-138 and accompanying text (discussing this second type of 
balancing further). 
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Airlines.98 In Spurlock, an airline imposed as minimum qualifica-
tions for its flight officers 500 hours of flight time and a college 
degree. 99 A black applicant who had accumulated 204 hours of 
flight time and two years of college challenged the qualifications for 
their disparate impact on blacks. The court established a "sliding 
scale" of business necessity, imposing on the defendant a lighter 
burden to demonstrate business necessity when "the job clearly 
requires a high degree of skill and the economic and human risks 
involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great. "100 The 
court, in effect, permitted the importance of the employer's goal to 
compensate for weaknesses in the means used to achieve it. 
2. Balancing Employee Harm Against Employer Harm 
a. Theoretical Rationales for Imposing a Per Se Test. Several 
commentators have argued that courts should adopt a balancing 
test that would weigh the degree of impact on the protected group 
against the degree of employer need for the practice.101 Advo-
98 4 75 F.2d 216 (lOth Cir. 1973); see also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 
568, 587 n.31 (1979) (noting where ultimate goal was passenger safety, business necessity 
defense required that criterion significantly serve, though not necessarily be required by, 
that goal). 
99 Spurlock, 475 F.2d at 219. 
100 I d. As one study of employment discrimination law states: 
The analysis in Spurlock could lead to the ironic situation that the 
higher the level of the job, the less the burden on the employer to show 
that the qualifications are actually related to the ability to perform that 
job. . . . (However,] the Spurlock approach has been narrowly limited to 
jobs involving high risk to life and limb. 
CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
57 (1980). 
101 E.g., Moore & Braswell, supra note 35, at 491 (asserting where "degree of disparate 
impact is not devastating and precision of plaintiffs evidence is obscured by the inability to 
isolate the impact separately," employer's justification burden should be lighter): Mack A. 
Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: 
Burdens of Proof, Statistical Evidence, and Affirmative Action, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 36-
44 (1989); Rutherglen, supra note 45, at 1327; Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact 
Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799, 825 (1985). 
Moore and Braswell posit the case in which an employer uses a subjective decisionmaking 
process with a discriminatory impact and in which the "degree of impact is not devastating" 
and the "precision of plaintiffs evidence is obscured by the inability to isolate the impact 
separately by practice." Moore & Braswell, supra note 35, at 491. In this case, they argue, 
the employer should have to show merely "the existence and consistent use of job-related 
[i.e., not absolutely necessary to the business] guidelines for [its] discretionary performance 
appraisals, and an overall relationship between the promotion system and legitimate 
employment goals. . . . In each instance, the magnitude of the potentially troublesome 
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cates of such balancing suggest that this approach would success-
fully account for Congress's concern with reconciling the employee's 
interest in equal opportunity and the employer's interest in 
preserving business autonomy.102 
In the business necessity context, a hard and fast "rules" 
approach is preferable to such sliding scale balancing.103 A rules 
or "classificatory" approach104 inquires first whether the effect of 
the defendant's practice may properly be classified as "disparately 
impacting a protected group." If so, then a straightfonvard 
application of the rule requiring absolute business necessity 
resolves the case. 
The rules approach does not ignore congressional concern for 
business autonomy. Rather, it is itself the product of a balance 
already struck by Congress.105 The task of the courts is to apply 
the resulting rule. The preference for a per se rule in the business 
necessity context finds support in the reasoning that generally 
underlies choices between rules and balancing and specifically in 
'business necessity' defense would vary with the size and demonstrability of the disparate 
impact." I d. at 492. 
102 Moore & Braswell, supra nota 35, at 485; cf. Chandler, supra nota 44, at 922 (positing 
purpose of business necessity defense is to protect goals of economic efficiency and 
entrepreneurial freedom). But see Note, A No-Alternaliue Approach, supra note 40, at 116 
(rejecting balancing approach as permitting employer increases in efficiency and snfety to 
be offset by correspondingly larger impact on plaintiff group). Similarly, some who assert 
that impact analysis is in reality a way of redressing covert intentional discriminntion 
likewise argue for a sliding scale of burden on the defendant. The greater the impact, the 
greater the likelihood that intent is at work; therefore, the burden should be greater on the 
defendant to show that its practice is effective in meeting its business goal. Perry, supra 
note 17, at 26 n.128. 
103 Professor Sullivan has distinguished balancing tests from n rules-oriented or 
"categorization" approach. Balancing, she notes, "explicitly considers all relevant factors 
with an eye to the underlying purposes or background principles or policies at stake.• 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justic:e~J of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 24, 60 {1992). Professor Sullivan explnin.s that a balancing 
test equates with the concept of standard-based decisionmaking, whereas n cla.ssifacatory or 
"categorical" approach equates with a rules approach. Id. nt 60. 
104 The term "classificatory" derived from discussions of the rules-versus-balancing 
approach in the first amendment context. Note, Ciuil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 
78 YALE L.J. 842, 844 (1969) [hereinafter Nota, Ciuil Disabilities] (discussing ProfeSS{)r 
Emerson's description of "classificatory approach•). 
105 Chandler, supra note 44, at 922 (asserting the "degree of protection [the business 
necessity] defense provides depends on weight given to competing gonls-nlegislntive value 
judgment"). 
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the Title VII context. 106 
Most importantly, the employment discrimination arena is 
inappropriate for balancing because of the danger that decision-
maker bias may affect the outcome.107 Professor Frederick 
Schauer has explained how the potential for bias counsels against 
utilization of balancing tests: 
We understand that any decision-making procedure 
will make errors. When rule-based decision-making 
is in place, the most noteworthy error is the failure 
on some number of occasions to make the best or 
optimal decision in the particular case. But when 
particularistic [e.g., balancing] decision-making 
prevails, the most noteworthy errors will be those in 
which misguided decision-makers-whether biased, 
106 FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULEs-A PHILOSOPHICAL ExAMINATION OF 
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 151-52 (1991); Duncan M. Kennedy, 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Martha 
Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV, 
10, 26-30 (1987); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 
(1988); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179-80 
(1989); Sullivan, supra note 103, at 60. But see Note, Civil Disabilities, supra note 104, nt 
846 n.16 (noting application of balancing in context of indirect speech regulation-based 
discrimination). In addition to the danger decisionmaker bias poses to application of a 
business necessity balancing test, theorists offer another rationale that tends to call for a por 
se rule in the business necessity determination. A per se rule better addresses the goal of 
instilling vigilance in potential parties to avoid precisely the problem that gave rise to the 
suit. See Rose, supra, at 591 (asserting use of rules in lieu of standards causes people to 
guard against problems sued upon by rendering actors extra vigilant). According to 
Professor Louis Kaplow, the advantage of rules in affecting parties' primary behavior (such 
as the behavior that ultimately results in the lawsuit) is that people who know what the law 
is will conform to it, and people are more likely to know what the law is when rules are 
applied because it is less expensive to learn the content of rules than of standards. Louis 
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,564 (1992). 
107 See Maria L. Marcus, Wanted: A Federal Standard for Evaluating the Adequate State 
Forum, 50 MD. L. REV. 131, 205 n.368 (1991) (noting tendency of courts applying balancing 
approach to assign heavy weight to whatever interest defendant proffers, thereby defeating 
plaintiffs claim); Scalia, supra note 106, at 1179-80 (arguing that rules approach moro 
effective than balancing approach in providing "check upon arbitrary judges"); Sullivan, 
supra note 103, at 65 (describing Justice Scalia's arguments in favor of rules and noting 
"[b]alancing tests permit the expression of'political or policy preferences.'"). But see Note, 
Civil Disabilities, supra note 104, at 846 n.16 (noting courts' application of balancing where 
speech regulation discriminated indirectly, but not where regulation discriminated 
intentionally). 
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ignorant, incompetent, or simply confused-will 
make decidedly non-optimal decisions. In attempting 
to design a decision-making procedure, we assess as 
best we can the expected frequency and consequences 
of these two types of errors. When the result of that 
assessment is a preference for rules, there is implicit 
in the preference a judgement that the errors that 
might be made by misguided decision-makers are 
more serious or more likely than the rule-based 
errors that come from a built-in failure to reach the 
very best decision in every case. 108 
421 
Professor Sullivan has also identified the potential for bias as a 
reason for avoiding balancing tests: If "rules are fairer than 
standards [because] rules require decisionmakers to act consistent-
ly, treating like cases alike, [then] rules reduce the danger of 
official arbitrariness or bias by preventing decisionmakers from 
factoring the parties' particular attractive or unattractive qualities 
into the decisionmaking calculus. "109 
Similarly, Professor Kennedy has identified the "social virtues of 
[rules in lieu of standards] to [include] the restraint on official 
arbitrariness. "110 In describing what he calls "the social science 
108 SCHAUER, supra note 106, at 154. Moreover, where there is reason to distrust a set 
of decisionmakers with certain kinds of decisions, "the problems of inflexibility that rules 
pose are less prevalent than problems that too much discretion will yield.• I d. at 152. But 
cf. id. at 153 (explaining that "the choice of rule-based decision-making ordinmily entails 
disabling wise and sensitive decision-makers from making the best decisions in order to 
disable incompetent or simply wicked decision-makers from making wrong decisionsj. 
109 Sullivan, supra note 103, at 62. Professor Tribe likewise notes that judicial decisions 
are a function of the characteristics of the people elevated to judgeships. Lawrence H. Tribe, 
Constituticruzl Calculus: Equal Justice or EconomicE{ficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REv. 592,598-99 
n.37 (1985). 
11° Kennedy, supra note 106, at 1688. Kennedy defines •official nrbitrnriness• OB "the sub 
rosa use of criteria of decision that are inappropriate in view of the underlying purposes of 
the rule, .. • rang[ing] from corruption to political bias. • /d. He argues that a person's 
consideration of the desired outcome in choosing whether a rule or standard should govern 
a particular situation does not fully explain the selection of one over the other. Id. at 1710. 
Rather, such a choice additionally is founded on the view of the world held by the selector: 
generally, the altruist chooses principles and the individualist chooses rules. Id. Kennedy 
cautions, however, that adoption of rules rather than standards imposes a different sort of 
arbitrariness on judicial decisionmaking: over· and underinclusiveness at the margins or 
borders of the rules' coverage. I d. at 1689. 
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approach" to lawmakers' decisions to adopt rules in lieu of stan-
dards, Kennedy explains that rules are chosen when there is 
concern that the person charged with implementing the rule will be 
unsympathetic to the policies underlying the rule.111 If in Title 
VII cases there is an unusual danger that courts will place too 
much importance on the employer's profit motive and too little 
importance on the plaintiff's right to equal opportunity, then 
"formally realizable general rules ... would function much better 
than standards to force the [court] to put the [legislator's] view of 
the issue into practice. "112 
Even if it is correct that balancing is inappropriate in situations 
posing an unusual danger of bias, what is it about employment 
discrimination that increases the likelihood of decisionmaker bias? 
Why is bias more likely to taint balancing in the employment 
discrimination context than it is in, say, torts suits? Ideally, judges 
who (at least at the federal level) are carefully screened by both the 
executive and the legislative branches113 either are not prejudiced 
or can rise above their prejudices. 114 
111 Id. at 1706. Kennedy draws a parallel between rules and individualism (Ralph Wnldo 
Emerson's doctrine of self-reliance) and between standards and altruism. Id. at 1713-1778. 
Still, Kennedy notes that an altruistic judge may do well to apply a strict rule when doing 
so protects the most vulnerable classes of people from exploitation. Id. at 1777. 
112 Id. at 1706. To advocate a per se business necessity rule in impact cases docs not 
state any general position on the overall efficacy of rules over standards. Professor Kennedy 
further notes: 
In assessing a proposal to change a regime of rules to standards, or vice 
versa, we should ignore all claims about the intrinsic merits of formal 
positions and demand an accounting of effects. What is the substantive 
objective? How does the choice of form affect the likelihood of embodying 
the objective in law? 
Id. at 1709. Professor Schauer notes that those favoring rules rather than more flexible 
decisionmaking tend to envision a decision as being made in a vacuum. They "tako tho 
dampening of variance as a good to be pursued in its own right, and see rules as instruments 
of that dampening process. SCHAUER, supra note 106, at 155. 
113 As a rule, juries are available in disparate treatment cases, but not disparate impact 
cases. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-73 
(1991) (allowing juries in cases seeking compensatory and punitive damages but allowing 
such damages only in intentional cases). Although the facts in impact cases are determined 
by judges, not juries, the same confidence seemingly could be placed in jurors as well, given 
that voir dire should eliminate prospective jurors possessing bias against the group in 
question. 
114 See SCHAUER, supra note 106, at 137 (noting that balancing yields more just decisions 
than strict rules when decisionmaker is just). 
1996] BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE 423 
Regardless of the caliber and good faith of decisionmakers, 
problems ofbias are likely to occur whenever matters focus on race, 
sex, or other bases of discrimination. According to Professor 
Minow, the potential for bias in cases involving "difference," 
whether racial, sexual, or some other form of difference, heightens 
the significance of "tension between formal, predictable rules and 
individualized judgments under discretionary standards. "1115 
Racial and sexual bias is too firmly rooted in both the conscious 
and subconscious mind of this country and its judiciary to permit 
a cavalier dismissal of the prospect that it plays a role in judicial 
decisionmaking in discrimination cases. 116 
Legal and social norms have eHrninated the most visible manifes-
tations of prejudice, creating the misleading appearance that we 
have cured ourselves of prejudice altogether.117 In reality, preju-
dice has merely "gone underground." We may or may not be 
conscious of it, but prejudice remains a strong, motivating force in 
the citizens and judiciary of this country. 
115 Minow, supra note 106, at 26. Thus, imposition of a strict rule rnther than n 
balancing test addresses the perceived need to "exclud(e] from the calculus of decision 
specific factors likely to be misapplied by some class of decision-milkers, substituting cruder 
but less likely to be abused factors." SCHAUER, supra note 106, at 151--52. 
116 See Elaine Golin, Solving the Problem of Geruler and Racial Bias in Administrative 
Adjudication, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1532, 1545 (1995) (discussing bins in courts); L1.wrence, 
supra note 64, at 322-23 (discussing "ingrained• nature of racism in our culture); Girardeau 
A. Spann, Simple Justice, 73 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1073·1080 (1985) (same); cf. Mary E. Becker, 
From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1219, 1260 (1986) 
(noting special judicial bias in gender cases); John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles L. Knapp, 8e% 
Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 741 (1977) 
(same). 
Precisely because we so abhor our prejudice, we are likely to suppress our knowledge of 
it in order to avoid the pain of knowing about it. GoRDON W. ALLPoRT, THE NAniRE OF 
PREJuDICE 357 (1958); KENNETH B. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD 78 (1963); JOSEPH 
JASTROW, FREUD: His DREAM AND SEX THEORIES 12 (1948); see also Su.snn L. McCoin, Note, 
Sex Discrimination in the Voir Dire Process: The Rights of Prospective Female Jurors, 58 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 1225, 1251 (1985) (discussing prejudice in jury selection). 
117 See Donald C. Nugent, JudicU:d Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 45-48 (1994) (explnining 
covert nature of bins in courts). 
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That unconscious prejudice is rampant in this country is 
exemplified by the results of a 1994 housing segregation study 
reported in the American Sociological Review .118 That study 
identified 
a gap between attitude and behavior among whites 
in this country. [The study concluded that] most 
whites today endorse the principle of equal opportu-
nities for blacks in the housing market, but [the 
researchers'] analysis of 232 metropolitan areas 
"suggests that most whites are uncomfortable when 
numerous blacks enter their neighborhoods."119 
Because we are not on guard against unacknowledged prejudice, it 
poses a far more ominous threat to fair decisionmaking than 
articulated, challengeable prejudice. Our prejudice is rendered 
more invidious by its subconsciousness. 120 
b. The General Rejection of Balancing in Title VII Adjudica-
118 Reynolds Farley & William H. Frey, Changes in the Segregation ofWhites from Blacks 
During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society, 59 AM. Soc. REv. 23 (Feb. 
1994). 
119 Ann Seng, Voice of the People: Little Progress in Race Relations, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 8, 
1995, at 28 (citations omitted); see also CLARK, supra note 116, at 35 (noting people's 
behavior reflected more prejudice than their self-reports). 
120 See CLARK, supra note 116, at 70, 72 (positing that prejudiced individuals show less 
self-insight than non-prejudiced individuals and that people with "acceptable" levels of 
prejudice, although outraged by open, bigoted behavior, usually respond passively and 
silently in its face). It is argued that balancing "[satisfies] a civic republican commitment 
to 'resolving normative disputes by conversation, a communicative practice of open and 
intelligible reason-giving.' " Sullivan, supra note 103, at 68 (quoting Frank I. Michelmnn, 
The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Gouernment, 100 HARV. L. REv. 
4, 34 (1986)). Civic republicans argue that a balancing test 
compels a judge to take full responsibility for his decisions, and promises 
a particularized, rational account of how he arrives at them-more 
particularized and more rational at least than the familiar parade of ••• 
absolutes. . . . [T]his approach should make it more difficult for judges 
to rest on their predispositions without ever subjecting them to the test 
of reason. It should make their accounts more rationally auditable. 
Id. (quoting Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the 
Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821, 825-26 (1962)). To the extent balancing tests require decision· 
makers to reveal the ideas leading to their decisions, this is true. However, when nn 
unusually strong subconscious bias exists against the parties having the least power to begin 
with, full and open reason-giving is defeated. The bias is present, but surely not articulated. 
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tion. Consistent with the above rationale, most Title vn decision-
making has eschewed a balancing approach in favor of a rules 
approach. For example, once the fact of disparate treatment is 
found and no defense can be established, liability is certain. No 
consideration is given to the strength of the plain tift's established 
case in deciding whether the defendant has established its defense. 
No balancing of harms occurs.121 Rather, Title vn directs courts, 
for the most part, to find facts to which law can then be applied. 
The suggestion, then, that business necessity should be the subject 
of balancing by the factfinder proposes an exception to Title Vll's 
general mandate. 
In the few Title VII cases where courts have purported to balance 
interests, such balancing essentially masked what turned out to be 
straightforward decisions for employers. Perhaps the best example 
is Title VII's requirement that an employer reasonably accommo-
date practices required by a worker's sincerely held religious 
beliefs.122 In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 123 the Supreme 
Court created a balancing test for determining whether an 
employer had met its duty to accommodate its employee's religious 
practices. The Court appears to have relied, at least in part, on the 
fact that religious practitioners are physically capable of modifying 
their practices.124 The Court concluded the employer had ade-
quately accommodated Hardison's religious practices when adopting 
a more accommodating practice would have "assure[ d) Hardison ... 
of getting the days off necessary for strict observance of [his] 
religion, but ... only at the expense of others who had strong, but 
perhaps nonreligious, reasons for not working on weekends."125 
121 Balancing of evidence occurs in the process of factfmding, which is difTerent from 
determining the ultimate outcome of a case by balancing plaintiffs hnrm with defendant's 
harm. In the latter, the ultimate issue is not whether unlawful discrimination has occurred, 
but instead it is who would suffer the most from an adverse decision. 
122 See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(0}{2)(ii) (1995) (providing employer must offer accommodation 
not causing undue hardship on employer that least disadvantages the worker); sre also Sara 
L. Silbiger, Note, Heaven Can Wait: Judicial Intupretation of Title VIrs Religious 
Accommodation Requirement Since Trans World Airlines v. Hnrd.ison, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 
839, 857-861 (1985) (discussing Title VIrs religion-accommodation requirements); Note, 
.Atxommodation of an Employee's Religious Praclice Under Title VII, 1976 U. Iu.. L. F. 867, 
871 (suggesting duty to accommodate religious practice imposes balancing test}. 
123 432 u.s. 63 (1977). 
124 Id. at 74. 
125 Id. at 81 (emphasis added). 
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Although Title VII's use of "reasonableness" language in the 
religious accommodation context supports a balancing test and 
although the accommodation test is often described as balanc-
ing, 126 the Hardison Court in fact imposed a per se rule, albeit 
one so de minimis as to require almost no showing by the employer 
at all. 127 Once a worker has established that an employment 
practice interfered with his sincerely-held religious practices, the 
employer is required merely to show that any alternative practice 
accommodating the worker would have involved some cost to the 
employer.128 Regardless of the extent of interference with the 
plaintiff's religious practices, the de minimis burden on the 
employer remains the same.129 It is not a balancing test at 
all.130 In effect, the decision to apply a balancing test in the Title 
VII context is akin to the decision to apply rational-basis scrutiny 
in the equal protection context: The case is decided in selection of 
the standard rather than in its application. It is a defendant-
favoring mechanism. 
If balancing is fraught with bias potential generally in Title VII 
cases, it is especially problematic in the business necessity context. 
In matters of business judgment, courts are likely to afford 
particular deference to the employer.131 When the court assesses 
not the importance of the practice but the importance ascribed to 
it by the employer, the test becomes one of good faith-the same 
test rejected in Griggs.132 Deference to employers' business 
126 See supra note 122 (citing supporting sources). 
127 The actual reason why the religion test must not heavily consider the worker's interest 
in her religious practice is to avoid judicial entanglement in religion. Silbiger, supra note 
122, at 857 n.136. 
128 Id. at 847. 
129 Id. at 857 n.l36. 
13° Cf. Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group 
Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 145 (positing courts' attempts to balance extent of governmon· 
tal burden on religion cannot accurately quantify religious experience because such 
experience is not reducible to rational terms). 
131 See Brodin, supra note 14, at 364-65 (arguing courts are ill-equipped to conduct cost-
benefit analysis of business practices). 
132 Courts' increased deference to an employer's judgment on business efficacy of a 
practice as the employer's business goal increases in importance is reminiscent of tho 
mentality that, in times of crisis, human rights must give way when something else very 
important is at stake. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High 
Places, 95 HARv. L. REV. 945, 957 (1982) (noting at upper levels of employment, "where 
courts feel that the quality of performance really matters, they may be reluctant to interfere 
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judgment destroys the impact concept entirely/33 for the idea of 
impact analysis is that good faith is no defense to a neutral practice 
with discriminatory impact.134 
Balancing tests, moreover, invite deference to the party whose 
situation most closely approximates that of the judge.135 Judges, 
who often share the perspective of the employer more than that of 
the employee, are likely to find the employer's actions acceptable as 
long as they are not too far removed from what the judge himself 
would do in comparable circumstances.136 Such deference verges 
on creating a standard of reasonableness or rationality. Yet, one 
cannot ask simply whether the employer was being rational; 
ongoing businesses do not stay profitable by making irrational 
decisions. 
3. Balancing the Importance of An Employer's Goal Against the 
Efficacy of Its Practice. In the second type of balancing, courts 
impose on the employer a lesser burden because the employer's goal 
is deemed especially important. For example, courts are vlilling to 
assume the need for safety.137 The fact that an employer's safety 
with traditional selection means•). 
133 See Bartholet, supra note 132, at 1026 ("[P]utting the st.runp of judicialnpprovnl on 
racially exclusionary systems is seriously unjust if in fact the 'fmding' that the systems nre 
job related is based simply on judges' views that systems with which they nre personally 
familiar make sense."). 
134 Id. But cf. Rutherglen, supra note 45, at 1320 ("[T]aken together, the pln.inti.fi's 
evidence of adverse impact and the defendant's evidence ofbusinessjustificntion must reveal 
a significant risk that the disputed employment practice could be used as a pretext for 
discrimination."). 
135 Cf. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187,201 (1991) (noting 
in BFOQ context inappropriateness of accepting employer's decision of what makes 
candidates qualified). 
135 See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Markel: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1552 (1983) (stating antidiscrimination laws, by suggesting 
that instances of discrimination are irrational and cnpricious departures from normal 
objective operation of markets, disguise systemic nature of bins in ra .. ·or of dominnnt [i.e., 
white male] workers); see also Barbara A Hocking, Islhe Reasonable Man the Righl Man for 
the Job?, 17 ADEL. L. REv. 79, 86 (1995) (arguing "it is implicit within an orgnnizational 
structure that like will recruit and promote like, that difference is disadvantage-,; Margaret 
Thornton, Hegemonic Masculinity and lhe .Aclukmy, 17 INTL J. SOC. L. 115, 122 (1989) 
(positing "homogeneity is a central value of any organizntionnl culture since it is conducive 
to the maintenance of bureaucratic control and efficiency"). 
137 See generally Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216 (lOth Cir. 1973) (permitting 
business necessity defense where employer could not establish direct relationship between 
requirement of minimum flight time and training success). 
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motif justifies deference to its need for the ultimate safety goal, 
however, does not justify deference to the means chosen by the 
employer to achieve safety when that means is discriminatory.138 
Courts do not owe employers deference on the choice of means, 
even if deference is owed on the choice of ends. 
Moreover, the same reasons not to give deference to employer 
judgment generally, as described above, apply with equal force in 
the choice of means. The problem with deferring to an employer's 
business judgment about what practices it may utilize is that 
management decisions to employ particular hiring criteria are the 
products of a subconscious point of view that envisions a workplace 
full of people like the manager.139 The manager may not deliber-
ately choose a criterion excluding people dissimilar to himself, but 
when the manager envisions the type of worker the criterion aims 
to select, he imagines a person like himself.140 Thus, the manag-
er charged with assessing the efficacy of a practice may not 
adequately guard against his own subconscious expectations of the 
people to be selected and against the disparate impact the selecting 
Not all safety goals may be assumed to qualify as proper business purposes. In tho 
disparate treatment context, for example, the Court held that the goal of protecting workers' 
fetuses was not within the essence of battery manufacturing and therefore was not a BFOQ. 
International Union, UA W v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 205-06 (1991). 
138 See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1119 n.6 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding 
employer invoking safety defense must nevertheless establish necessity and does not receive 
absolute court deference); Jeffrey D. Kirtner, Note, English-Only Rules and the Role of 
Perspective in Title VII Claims, 73 TEx. L. REV. 871, 913-14 (1995) (discussing limits on use 
of safety-based business necessity defense). 
139 Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 970 (1993); see also DERRICK 
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 140-61 (1987) 
(suggesting white-dominated workplace that admits minorities will halt such admissions to 
maintain white dominance); Bartholet, supra note 132, at 1026 (asserting system has failed 
to consider alternative methods of selection due to tendency of those who are "in" to 
perpetuate systems that got them there); Minow, supra note 106, at 13 ("By granting 
discretion to ... private decisionmakers, ... judges ... allow[] those decisionmakers to give 
significance to differences."). If courts "cede discretion to other decisionmakers[,] .•• [they 
allow] the decisionmaker with the discretion to take difference into account in an 
impermissible manner." I d. at 26. Professor Minow discussed the tension among tho 
Supreme Court Justices during the 1986 Term, between those wanting to preserve the 
discretion of decisionmakers and those wanting to avoid the discrimination resulting whon 
decisionmakers are given unchecked discretion. Id. passim. 
140 Chamallas, supra note 62, at 2392. 
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criterion may yield.141 
In fact, cultural-domination theorists argue that as soon as 
women or minorities begin to satisfy a requirement that had 
heretofore excluded them (for example, admission to law school), 
the organization subconsciously responds by adopting a different 
standard, precisely to keep the number of women or minorities at 
a level low enough to maintain white-male dominance within the 
organization. 142 Thus, deference to the defendant's business 
judgment in this context threatens the integrity of decisionmaking. 
Deferring to the defendant's business judgment "leaves intact the 
very managerial prerogative which has built the discriminatory 
base."143 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The 1991 Act's codification of the disparate impact doctrine has 
opened the door for long needed clarification and strengthening of 
the business necessity defense. That defense should require an 
employer to prove that its discriminatory practice is essential to its 
continued operation. Under the structure created by the 1991 Act, 
141 Professor Chamallas explains that a "focus on the inadequacy of the excluded group• 
has created a tendency not to scrutinize the criteria that have excluded them. I d. at 2372. 
This focus on the victim's shortcomings rather than on the criteria thnt exclude the victims 
allows "existing organizations [and] professions• to continue to exclude such victims without 
challenge. I d. at 237 4. "'n [this] motivational account, responsibility lies with the individual 
worker; the employer is required only to measure or judge each worker evenhandedly using 
conventional standards." Id. at 2377. 
142 E.g., id. at 2387. 
143 Hocking, supra note 136, at 83; see also Chandler, supra note 44, at 934 (arguing 
Griggs simply prevents employers from using non-economic criteria-criteria unrelated to 
job performance-that decrease minority opportunities). 
Mountain Side Mobile Estates Partnership v. HUD, 56 F.3d 1243 (lOth Cir. 1995), 
illustrates this point. In Mountain Side, a Title VIII case applying a business necessity test 
identical to that of Title VII, the defendant argued that inherent limitations on the park's 
sewer system required it to impose the three-person-per-unit policy chnllenged as 
discriminatory against families with children. Although n study commissioned by the 
defendant itself contradicted the sewer system-based argument, the Tenth Circuit acxeptcd 
the defendant's additional, unsupported arguments pertaining to •quality of life• and found 
that business necessity was established. ld. at 1256. The holding seems particularly 
troubling because the defendant had adopted the policy at the exact time that the Fair 
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988), rendered discrimination against families with young 
children unlawful. Id. at 1246. 
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an employer must prove that the goal it seeks to achieve through 
the practice is crucial to its continued viability and, in turn, that 
the practice selected is crucial to the achievement of that goal. The 
employer may meet the second part of this test by producing 
evidence that the practice significantly and efficiently achieves the 
goal and by rebutting the plaintiff's evidence of the availability of 
a less-discriminatory alternative. 
Moreover, requiring an employer to prove a strict level of need 
for its discriminatory practice comports with the proof structure in 
impact cases contemplated by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Parallels 
between the analytical structure of disparate impact cases and 
disparate treatment cases demonstrate that the stringent BFOQ-
defense standard applied in treatment cases is equally appropriate 
in impact cases. Alternatives to this standard thwart the objectives 
of Title VII by disproportionately favoring defendants. 
